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Dissecting the EU’s Directive on Copyright: Implications for Creative Tools,
Collaboration Sites, and End-users.
Jacob Jensen1
Technology complicates copyright law. One of the best examples of this is the World
Wide Web, which has caused debate over whether to favor copyright holders or internet hosting
and distribution sites in copyright legislation. This conflict has produced disparate results in a
wide variety of nations, but one consistency that transcends boundaries has been the protection
of internet sites that host and distribute media from liability in copyright litigation. The European
Union’s (EU) new Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Copyright in the Digital Single Market2 is the yet-to-be approved directive that will likely pass
this year. It is a strikingly different example of a copyright law because it privileges
rightsholders3 over hosting sites.4 While many view this proposal as a solution to difficulties
rightsholders face in receiving compensation for their work, the EU’s model creates an unjust
burden on the average end-user5, especially in terms of online collaboration sites and creative
tools.
While much of the opposition to the EU’s directive has been lobbying from internet
giants such as Google, many internet users would be negatively affected by this new take on
copyright enforcement. Unfortunately, some of the greatest flaws in the directive are obscured by
lobbying from internet giants.6 Due to the obscured view of the proposal’s implications,
advocates of the directive largely dismiss the other potential problems that might stem from the
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will refer to such technologies as “filters”, “content filters”, or similar.
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directive’s requiring of content recognition filters. This paper will seek to reveal some of the
flaws in the proposal.
Typically, originality is seen as a good trait in legislation, but it can also lead to
unintended consequences which should be avoided since the internet is such an essential part of
everyday life. In seeking to update copyright law to be fairer to rightsholders, the EU should base
changes on successful copyright law like the United States’ Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), which is described in the next section, and should be beneficial to media creators,
business and hosting site creators, and end-users. Additionally, collaboration-based sites like
Dropbox, Google Drive, and Git Hub should be given exceptions to filtering requirements so that
users may have instant access to the materials they are working with.
To prove this claim, this paper will set forth the fundamental aspects of copyright and
moral rights in section I, investigate the different claims of parties arguing for and against the
proposal in section II, demonstrate the flaws in the directive in section III, address the DMCA as
a model in section IV, provide suggestions to improve the directive in sections V, VI, and VII.
The suggestions in this paper are not comprehensive, nor do they all apply to the EU proposal as
it now stands. Instead, this paper addresses problems that have arisen in different drafts of the
directive or which may appear in other legislative courts in the future. These less-imminent
problems are included since they could return to legislation in the near future.
I. Background
A. Copyright
Copyright enables the creator of an original work to control the distribution and use of
their ideas, typically for a limited time. Most countries that have copyright law have very
specific rules and regulations, including limitations and exceptions to the power of rightsholders,
primarily through fair use.
Fair use refers to certain exceptions to copyright law permitted to individuals, businesses,
and the press, aimed at preserving free speech and open discussion. Among the different
categories of fair use are parody, commentary, criticism, and certain educational purposes,
especially in research. Fair use can range drastically in its coverage between different countries
and doesn’t exist at all in many jurisdictions. Some countries, including the United Kingdom,
have a different framework.
Historically, copyright law has been enforced primarily through personal copyrightholder enforcement. Owners of copyrighted material were responsible for investigating illegal
uses of their media, requesting removal of that media, and pursuing litigation. Since this system
does not require hosting sites to patrol user uploads, entire businesses have emerged to seek out
instances of copyright infringement and sell that information to copyright holders so that they
may pursue litigation against copyright infringers.7
The DMCA is the United States’ solution to problems of content hosting site’s liability. It
creates provisions under which a site might be liable. For example, if the site had prior
knowledge of unlicensed materials being hosted and chose not to remove them. The act also
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For example, the unlicensed-copyrighted materials filtering business Digimarc.

allows rightsholder to notify a hosting site if there are unlicensed media being hosted, after
which the site becomes liable if they are latent in, or fail in, removing the media.8
Secondary liability is a facet of common law that can make an indirect violator of
copyright—for example someone who assists in or causes a direct violator to break copyright
law—also liable for the infringement.9 Much of the discussion about the EU’s directive on
copyright is about the way it extends secondary liability,10 will be covered in more depth later.
B. Moral Rights
The justifications for European and American copyright law are fundamentally different.
European copyright law is intended to defend moral rights, the philosophy that copyrighted
materials are owned by the creator and can only be used with permission from them.11 While the
moral rights of attribution and integrity are acknowledged almost everywhere, the moral right to
economic interests is principal in European law, while American copyright law exists to
encourage innovation and creation in the absence of economic moral rights.12 The extent of
creators’ rights differs between countries even in the European Union, ranging from having
absolute control of creative use, even after selling their rights, to having no say in creative
changes after they license their rights to other parties.13
Sections of this paper will make claims that only apply to one perspective or the other.
However, the aggregate argument is intended to resolve the question of liability in copyright
regardless of stance on moral rights.
C. The Internet and the Digital Age
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The arguments in this article will revolve around the way that media ‘platforms’14 are
viewed in legislation and litigation. Perspectives about media platforms differ drastically
between and within countries. Some view a platform as a canvas that users interact with as they
please—the creators having no responsibility or liability when it comes to what the users do with
the platform.15 Others, including those propagating the EU proposal, view platforms as
publishers—expected to make licensing deals with rightsholders and liable for any copyright
infringement that takes place on their servers.16
Content Recognition Filters are software that websites employ to scan file uploads from
users for similarities to copyright protected media, blocking the uploading of anything deemed
too likely to be a copyrighted work. Different examples of this exist across the internet. One
example of this is YouTube’s Content ID17, which was prompted not by legal requirement, but
by a desire to make contracts with rightsholders for their music and TV streaming services.18
This is significant because it demonstrates that effective upload filters can be encouraged in the
law using incentives different from the EU’s proposal. Content Recognition Filters can range in
coverage from recognizing only text excerpts or individual images, to artificial intelligencesupported software that distinguish between copyright infringement and fair use (e.g. parody,
commentary, criticism, etc.).

D. European Law and the directive
In EU law, the European Parliament can create directives, but it is up to each member
country to decide upon some of the specific applications of that directive. While many countries
may only barely meet the requirements in the directive, the differences between countries in the
union could be large enough to affect international business over the internet.
II. The Current Debate
The current debate about digital copyright enforcement is based largely around two
arguments: the free internet argument, and the protected internet argument. Those who advocate

Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of ‘Platforms,’ 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y. 347. 348 (2010).
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18
See id.
14
15

a free internet seek an open internet where users can post, share, and collaborate as they please.19
This model requires the copyright holder's own efforts to ensure copyright law is observed. The
protected internet argument claims that the internet should be a safe place for intellectual
property and that the government should interfere to ensure that creators are compensated for use
of their work.20 The unlicensed sharing of property, then, becomes much more difficult.
The protected internet argument is primarily concerned with compensating creators
whose work is being used illegally. In the case of the EU’s directive this is accomplished through
upload filters and making hosting websites liable for unlicensed material on their servers.21 Many
of those who uphold this argument are media creators whose ability to receive compensation for
their original work is inhibited by current internet culture and the prevalence of websites that
allow illegal streaming of music, movies, and TV shows.22 For creators, the internet often
undermines the ability to make money from their copyrighted work.23 Their pleas to
governments to help enforce their legal right to an income is substantive and justified, but either
do not consider the potential casualties of such a dramatic change, or do not care. Attempts to
meet creators’ needs must be balanced to maintain uses of the internet besides that of a media
marketplace.
Proponents of the free internet argument claim that websites should continue to be free
from liability24 so long as they meet the basic copyright requirements like those set forth in the
DMCA and other forms of copyright legislation. It argues for the unfiltered uploading of media
so that users can have a free sharing platform, and so that firms that create these spaces can avoid
the immense costs of developing filtering software.

See generally Julia Reda, If we don’t act now, Article 13 could break the internet by mistake,
WIRED (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/article-13-will-kill-the-internet-bymistake/.
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or Negligible?, NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY (Aug. 13, 2014),
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Vint Cerf et al., Article 13 of the EU Copyright Directive Threatens the Internet, EFF (2018),
https://www.eff.org/files/2018/06/12/article13letter.pdf.
“By inverting this liability model and essentially making platforms directly responsible for
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These concerns come from internet users who are also media creators, raising the concern of
favoring one type of creativity over others.25
Additionally, proponents of this argument worry that increased liability of media hosting
sites will prevent the growth and development of new websites. For many, the idea of a
completely filtered internet threatens online collaboration, subcultures (including memes and
certain forum types), and even the ability to upload original content that might not make it past
imperfect filters.26 It should not be a surprise that the EU’s directive is seen as a threat to this
vision of the internet.
Since the two sides have such varied needs, effective compromise is necessary. It is our
position that the EU’s proposed directive will not provide a fair compromise and is not a strong
model for any future reform. If new copyright legislation follows the most effective systems
currently in place—especially the DMCA—while making necessary improvements, a more
balanced system can be achieved, allowing not only media creators, but also media hosting
upstarts and users to benefit together. This will allow for a more sustainable internet market.
III. Weaknesses of the EU’s Proposition
There are several flaws with the EU’s solution to copyright reform, and these flaws could
be even more detrimental if similar reforms came to other jurisdictions. They can be broken
down into flaws in the directive format that will be enacted differently by various member
countries, dangers of unfairness to websites that cannot maintain a sufficiently strong filter, and
the discrimination toward original media creators at the expense of other creators who have an
equal right to copyright law protection.
Directives do not require all member states to implement the requirement in the same
way.27 Additionally, the different member states’ opinions on the directive differ drastically,
which would imply that implementation would follow the same preferences those states already
have.28 If copyright enforcement law is not executed in the same way in all member countries,
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international businesses may have to build a filter that meets the requirements of all countries
they serve or incorporate unique filters for each country’s version of the website. This could
prove extremely detrimental to international business, not only with countries around the world
but also within the EU.
The application of absolute liability to hosting websites creates the danger of websites
being held accountable when they shouldn’t be. For example, they may be held liable for uploads
to their servers by criminal hackers or other exploitations of filtering technology. Conversely,
laws that require a certain level of filter strength or expense are unlikely to reach the solution of
complete media removal and will lead to filters being put into place to satisfy the law rather than
achieving the goals of the law.
The DMCA was enacted in large part to protect ISPs that had no knowledge of their
users’ involvement in criminal activity, in much the same way that a taxi service would not be
held liable if a criminal used their service as a getaway from a crime scene without the taxi
driver’s knowledge, or that a camera manufacturer would not be held liable if someone infringed
copyright law using their products.29
Regardless of the specific legal field, no law should make an unknowing third party,
having done its due diligence in preventing criminal activity using their product, liable. The EU’s
directive provides no evidence that there will be a clearly outlined standard of due diligence.
This would make it nearly impossible for a business to insure they are protected from
exploitation and unfair liability. In a legal world like this it would be nearly impossible to
maintain a filter sophisticated enough to completely avoid becoming guilty by another’s actions.
IV. Building on the DMCA’s Strengths
The DMCA has been one of the most successful legal actions regarding copyright law in
preventing excessive copyright infringement, simultaneously protecting innocent ISPs and Media
Platforms from unfair liability30. This section will demonstrate some of its strengths and some of
the areas that could be changed to increase content creators’ control.
Media-hosting sites, such as YouTube, use the word platform to indicate their desired
place in the digital world. They seek to avoid accountability for what is uploaded, and to evade
lawsuits, placing emphasis on the users' liability in illegal usage of copyrighted material.31 Due
to the terms set forth in the DMCA, it is fairly easy for most websites to stay safe from liability
in copyright infringement cases, largely due to extensive case law and examples of boundaries,
including the 1979 case Universal Studios v. Sony.32
all websites, while Germany thinks there should be exceptions for sites like Wikipedia and
GitHub.
29
Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break: On the Secondary Liability of
Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 111, 120 (2010).
(See footnote 44.)
30 See David Kravets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA is the Law That Saved the Web,
WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008), https://www.wired.com/2008/10/ten-years-later/.
31
Russ VerSteeg, Viacom v. YouTube: Preliminary Observations, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 43, 54
(2007).
32
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Amer., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979).

Critics are quick to point out that even media hosting sites in compliance with DMCA
standards often have large amounts of unlicensed media on their servers.is exemplified perfectly
in YouTube v. Viacom, in which emails between the creators of YouTube demonstrated quite
clearly that YouTube’s creators knew about unlicensed media on their servers. Nevertheless, the
court found them not guilty because the emails did not include URL-specific references to the
illicit uploads.33 Loosening the requirement so that the direct references to unlicensed media,
whether in email or other communication between senior leadership in a business, could be
counted as enough evidence would lead to a much more copyright-friendly internet and a fairer
one as well.
By making copyright laws that build on proven examples, internet cultures like that of
memes and forums can remain intact, while the easy distribution of unlicensed material is
prevented. The first step in this solution would be to acknowledge the roles that websites like
Facebook, the Google family of online services, and Wikipedia already play in the digital world.
In the context of the EU's directive on copyright, Facebook, Google, and Wikipedia—three
vastly different types of websites that serve different purposes—would all be required to
maintain similar filters against copyrighted content. This could be accomplished with relative
ease on Facebook, a site with massive income and resources to develop an adequate filter. On the
other hand, wiki sites (independent from Wikipedia and fan-run) have fewer resources and would
suffer heavily as donation-dependent sites.
As discussed above, the EU's Directive on Copyright does not consider the type of
website in its requirements, only stipulating that they make reasonable (left up to the
interpretation of individual countries) effort to prevent illicit uploading. Different drafts have
contained various exceptions, but most have been based on the size of the site, failing to
distinguish between for-profit businesses and blogs and forums that generate revenue.34 By
acknowledging distinctions in websites' intended purposes, the internet could remain a free place
making communication and collaboration more accessible.
V. Mandated Upload Filters
Nearly every problem addressed in this paper stems from the directive’s requirement to
have upload filters. Our position here is that the best response to this problem is to create
legislation that encourages, rather than mandates, filters. This encouragement could stem from
legislation modeled on the DMCA or through incentives to make licensing agreements like those
that encouraged YouTube’s Content ID.
When upload filters are directly called for by law, many websites will seek only to meet
the requirement of the law, not necessarily making any effort to prevent the usage of unlicensed
materials. However, legal requirements that directly address specific types of unlicensed media
are more likely to yield filters or alternative methods that solve the actual problem of copyright
infringement.
If laws are put in place that call specifically for filters, there are two essential factors that
must be accounted for: file size and immediate access. Audio, video, and image uploads of
different file sizes all require different methods of filtering. Upload filters would prevent real33
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34
Reda, supra note 28.

time uploading on social media, but smaller files and text could still be checked for plagiarism
almost instantaneously. While some might argue that real-time file access is trivial in social
media, collaboration on sites like Google Drive, iCloud, Drop Box and GitHub are dependent on
real-time access and necessitate exceptions to filters, at least in the case of privately shared,
small-audience media.
Specifics on these two exceptions will be addressed in sections VI and VII. Following
these prescriptions will help to keep the internet accessible and useful as a creative tool. These
suggestions also insure that there will be fewer instances of unlicensed media uploads. Only
when the following concerns are addressed can copyright law be fair to websites and internetbased businesses of all kinds.
VI. File Type Exceptions
The ubiquitous meme is under great threat by filters that would block all copyrighted
material being uploaded to social media platforms. In the United States, many memes are
protected under fair use, whether because they are parody, commentary, or criticism. While the
EU does not have the same ideas of fair use as the United States, there are still certain provisions
in copyright that protect commentary and criticism. For filters to allow legal fair use-file
uploading, they would either require AI that is beyond the capacity of many hosting websites, or
a special exception for certain media types that allows fair use-files to be uploaded. Providing
exceptions for hosting websites in small-file uploading provides a potential solution.
Creators do not directly lose any revenue when an average internet user takes a single
frame from one of their movies and uses it to convey a new idea or joke—in other words, a
meme.35 This works similarly when lower resolution images are used without a license. For
example, a photographer’s revenue for selling high resolution prints and copies is not affected
when an internet user distributes pixilated copies for personal use. By making websites only
liable for larger file hosting, filters will still be put in place to block the uploading of entire
movies, music videos, songs, or full resolution copyrighted photographs.
Despite the distinction between collaboration websites and social media websites in this
paper, the creative and cultural uses of neither platform can survive the damage of a filter that
screens all file uploads regardless of file size. Either filtering requirements will be too strong,
and most smaller websites with smaller revenue will be unable to create exemptions, or filters
will fail to achieve their original purpose and the law will result only in unnecessary expenses to
build ineffective filters.
Filters with file size exemptions will not prevent copyright infringement in the area of
text-based media, such as stories, lyrics, or poems. As such, any filter that allows small file
upload exceptions should also require text screeners like those used as plagiarism checkers in
order to prevent the uploading of poems, lyrics, or other short form media through small images.
While small file uploads by individual users should not be filtered, harsh copyright filter
is fitting for files being uploaded to larger entities' official pages on social media. This is because
it is easier for unhappy copyright owners to suffer significant damages when a profitable
business or social media personality posts their media for all followers to see. This can be easily
noted in Facebook's existing distinction of user accounts and business accounts. Casual
35

Memes might arguably have a negative effect on perceptions of media they borrow, having an
indirect effect on revenue, but this requires further study.

Facebook users have a limit of 5000 connections, not only including friends but also pages being
'liked' or followed, meaning an upload to a private user's account can only reach as many as 5000
people on Facebook. Similarly, Twitter and Instagram have methods whereby businesses or
famous people can be certified, proving that the account is official and not run by someone else.
VII. Instant Access
Collaborative web tools like Google Drive, iCloud, and Dropbox are extremely important
collaboration tools for original media creators who use their file sharing functions to work
together on files stored on the site, but they are also commonly used to share illegally uploaded
files. Filters sophisticated enough to prevent the uploading of large files in diverse formats would
not only be extremely expensive for the companies owning them but would also likely inhibit the
ability of collaborators to have fast access to files being uploaded. To meet the new laws of all
the EU countries affected by the new directive, the websites would probably have to slow down
access to uploaded files dramatically. This could compromise the website’s usefulness to online
creators, an equally important part of the creative community the EU’s proposal seeks to aid.
No matter how lenient the legal requirements for a filter may be, negative effects will
threaten creators who collaborate using these sites. Because of this unique need, exceptions are
necessary for uploads to online media-development tools. To prevent the abuse of these
exceptions, the simplest legal distinctions should focus on file uploads that have limited
viewership or allow editing on the site's services. To enforce copyright in these areas a window
of immunity after file upload could be followed by licensing audits. This would enable
collaborators to retain access to large files but prevent internet aided sharing of illicit uploads.
Admittedly, a window of immunity may be enough time for users to upload a file without
a license, distribute it, then remove it. This could be solved by requiring these sites to retain files
that are deleted before receiving an audit, and screen these for unlicensed use as well. These
suggestions make up only a fraction of the possible solutions to problems in the EU’s proposal.
VIII. Conclusion
Dramatic changes like those being developed in the European Union will decrease
innovation and creativity among collaborators who use internet services in their work, create
financial barriers to many business upstarts, and prevent the free end-user purposes of the
internet. Smaller changes, based on demonstrably-successful models like the DMCA, can bring
about more predictably beneficial results. The EU’s proposal has too many flaws that would
negatively affect creators who use the internet as a tool and end-users who do not intentionally
infringe copyright. Instead, the EU should abandon their proposed directive, or else should
amend it so that the internet may continue as a tool in innovation and creation. Copyright law
should not call directly for upload filters unless there are clearly outlined exceptions that allow
collaboration through media-storing websites.

